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Abstract—In this paper we explore how recent technologies can
improve the security of optical networks. In particular, we study how
to use quantum key distribution (QKD) in common optical network
infrastructures and propose a method to overcome its distance limitations.
QKD is the first technology offering information theoretic secret-key
distribution that relies only on the fundamental principles of quantum
physics. Point-to-point QKD devices have reached a mature industrial
state; however, these devices are severely limited in distance, since signals
at the quantum level (e.g. single photons) are highly affected by the losses
in the communication channel and intermediate devices. To overcome this
limitation, intermediate nodes (i.e. repeaters) are used. Both, quantum-
regime and trusted, classical, repeaters have been proposed in the QKD
literature, but only the latter can be implemented in practice. As a novelty,
we propose here a new QKD network model based on the use of not
fully trusted intermediate nodes, referred as weakly trusted repeaters. This
approach forces the attacker to simultaneously break several paths to get
access to the exchanged key, thus improving significantly the security of
the network. We formalize the model using network codes and provide
real scenarios that allow users to exchange secure keys over metropolitan
optical networks using only passive components. Moreover, the theoretical
framework allows to extend these scenarios not only to accommodate
more complex trust constraints, but also to consider robustness and
resiliency constraints on the network.
Index Terms—Network Coding; Quantum Key Distribution; Passive
Optical Networks; Trusted Repeaters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Optical network design has evolved over time to meet different
challenges: high bandwidth, deployment flexibility, multiuser require-
ments, etc. Other characteristics were considered secondary at the
time and added later, as their need or convenience became more
pressing. Security has been one of these secondary requirements. It
was usually taken for granted in optical networks due to the technical
difficulty of spying the signal carried by an optical fiber [1]. However,
technological advances and transformations in the structure of the
network changed the panorama and this is no longer true [2], [3]. On
one hand, sensitive detectors and small transponders are nowadays
able to perform, at a fraction of the cost and size, the operations
that previously needed rack-sized equipment. On the other, certain
network architectures simply does not lend itself to security [4],
[5]. As an example, downstream signals in a gigabit passive optical
network (GPON) arrive to all users and are only dismissed by a well
behaved optical network terminator (ONT). Nothing prevents them
to actually record the signals.
Classically, there are several ways to provide security in a network.
The most used one is just to add a cryptographic layer —independent
of the optical network layer— that ciphers all the communications
in the network. In a typical setting, a session key is exchanged in
some way, for example using asymmetric (public-key) encryption and
its underlying infrastructure (e.g. RSA and certification authorities)
or by having exchanged previously a physical storage media with a
pool of keys. Then, the exchanged key is used for a given maximum
amount of time or of ciphered data size. When the pool is exhausted,
a new one must be exchanged. In high security settings, no single
channel is considered safe enough and a mixture of several methods
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(physical and RSA, and at different times using different paths) are
used. While these are well-known techniques, they also have their
drawbacks. For instance, the security of RSA is still an unproven
assumption. Although its exponentially difficult nature has still to be
really challenged1, the continuous growth in power of the algorithms
and computers make for a constant revision of the recommended
key size. What once was considered secure during the age of the
earth, was actually broken in 17 years [6]. The recommendations
for security have steadily grown from a few hundred bits to 2048
bits [7] length or even close to 15 kbits for certain operations that
require a level of security equal to symmetric-key algorithms [8].
These are even bigger when long term security (≈ 20 years) is
required. Hence, if a technology is able to produce a continuous
supply of high quality symmetric keys all over a network, it would
be a welcome addition to its capabilities. In some cases as valuable
as bandwidth itself. In this regard, the purpose of this paper is to
explore a recent technology, namely quantum key distribution (QKD),
to provide security in an optical network and, in particular, to propose
some means to overcome its main limitation in distance through the
application of ideas from network coding.
Quantum key distribution [9] allows two legitimate parties to
generate a secret key even in the presence of an eavesdropper. The
key is known only to the parties, since the information leaked to an
eavesdropper can be bounded as tightly as they want. Hence, QKD is
a technology able to distribute information-theoretic secure keys. The
measurement of a quantum system in an unknown state modifies it
(except if the same basis is used for measurement and coding—state
preparation), thus allowing to detect the signals suspected to have
been read by an eavesdropper. No computational complexity assump-
tions are needed. Just the laws of physics and, of course, common
assumptions in cryptographic scenarios (e.g. the eavesdropper cannot
control the devices at his will). A QKD protocol requires a quantum
channel and an authenticated classical channel. The quantum channel
is a communication channel supporting the transmission of quantum
signals that are typically encoded as qubits: two states quantum
systems such as the horizontal/vertical polarization states of a single
photon. An optical fiber performs very well as a qubit carrier, hence
a purely optical network is a very good candidate to implement a
quantum network, i.e. a network based on the exchange of quantum
signals.
QKD technology is delicate, since it must deal with signals at the
quantum level. However, it has reached the point where devices able
to work unattended during months are commercially available [10],
[11]. As in any media, photons suffer an exponential attenuation while
propagating through the fiber. In conventional communications, this is
usually solved by using an amplifier, but in quantum communications
this cannot be done, as amplifying a signal is just a measurement
made to clone it, something forbidden at the quantum level by the
“no cloning” principle: if a signal is unknown (i.e. we do not know
for sure whether the qubit codes “1” or “0”—the single photon is
in a horizontal or vertical state of polarization, for example) the
1Except for a quantum computer that, in principle, is able to break the
RSA. Whether such a computer will be built is still a matter of debate.
2copy cannot be made exact [12]. A measurement made to obtain
information results in an increase of the error rate in the signal,
something that allows the detection of an eavesdropper.
Optical fiber is at the core of today’s data networks because of
its capability to support the bandwidth demand, relatively cheap
manufacture, easy deployment and long life. The bulk of the commu-
nications is carried by optical fiber. Optical networks are pervasive
nowadays, from long haul to fiber-to-the-home. Its bandwidth capac-
ity has put much pressure on the electronics in order to keep pace
with the raw transmission rate. Bandwidth, increase in reliability and
low power consumption have made preferable to keep as much of the
network in the purely optical domain. Therefore, most of the networks
being deployed today are passive optical networks (PON). These can
work under many different schemes, like the aforementioned GPON
or WDM-PON2, but all of them have the characteristic that no active
elements perturb the optical path—at least under typical metropolitan
area distances. Thus, it is possible to create a direct, uninterrupted,
optical path among two nodes in the network that is also able to
support a quantum channel for QKD.
This allows to seamlessly integrate QKD in optical networks,
where a quantum channel can be established between any two points
in the network. In this regard, a flurry of activity has started in
the field [13]–[19]; nevertheless, the distance limitation is still a
problem. Current distance records are around 260 km for a link
with experimental superconducting detectors [20]. This means the
capability to tolerate around 50 dB of losses, while commercial
implementations are still not capable of going beyond 20 dB. If we
take into account the insertion losses of typical optical components
(e.g. filters, multiplexers, splitters, etc.), this barely allows to span a
single access network3. To alleviate these problems, specific networks
devised for QKD have been proposed [10], [19], [21]–[23]. However,
these are not really practical since, on one hand, the cost of using
and deploying special infrastructures in populated environments, like
in cities, is prohibitively high and, on the other, it does not solve the
fundamental problem of limited reach.
Only quantum repeaters [24] would allow to extend the reach
without limits, but these are far beyond any practical technology
today. Beyond quantum repeaters, we are forced to use trusted
repeaters to overcome these losses. A trusted nodes network [25]
links two places through a series of shorter links that create a secret
key. The key produced in the first link is relayed to the destination by
encoding it with the keys created in the intermediate ones. Therefore,
the key is known by all intermediate nodes, making the key secure
only as long as all these are trusted. If a spy is successful attacking
one, all the key is known. Since this is the only practical possibility,
all network testbeds deployed up to date (e.g. [10], [19], [21]–[23])
make use of them in their design. The typical trusted node has
a complex design [22], it includes several QKD devices (one to
complete the pair needed in each link) and a computer to do all
the associated key management, etc. which makes it even harder to
certify [26], [27] to any security level. The reliance on all these
intermediate nodes makes trusted repeater networks expensive and
not acceptable by many users.
We propose here a new approach to alleviate the reliance condition
on trusted repeaters and apply it to the case of optical networks
using standard components. Our work is based on the new paradigm
provided by network coding [28]. The introduction of network coding
2Wavelength Division Multiplexing-PON.
3Although the new generation of QKD devices, able to withstand approxi-
mately 30 dB, is about to make their debut beyond the laboratories, reach is
still a problem. Even assuming perfect detectors, emitters working at several
GHz and new low losses fiber, there is no possibility of having any reasonable
key rate beyond ≈ 500 km.
by Ahlswede was a complete revolution in network theory: simple
flow processing by the nodes allows to improve different scenarios
in terms of throughput, needed resources and security. Here we use
the idea of network codes to reduce the dependence on the trusted
repeaters. We introduce conditional trust structures that guarantee
that, as long as there is no cooperation between specified sets of
weakly-trusted repeaters, the distributed key remains fully secret.
The name underscores the fact that some assumptions are no longer
needed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the basics
of network coding and the wiretap network model that support our
proposal. We have written the paper without assuming any previous
knowledge about network coding, in consequence, this section is to a
certain extent self-contained and should allow the reader to grasp the
fundamental principles of network coding. In Section III we discuss
the limitations of QKD and the need for intermediate repeaters.
These repeaters are currently fully trusted, but using network coding
principles we can impose a lighter trust constraint on the repeaters
and achieve the same information theoretic security. In Section IV
we discuss the integration of weakly-trusted repeaters on passive
optical networks and in Section V we describe some particular
scenarios. Finally, we summarize the discussion and draw some future
improvements in Section VI.
II. NETWORK CODING
Network coding is a paradigm where the intermediate nodes,
instead of simply forwarding the incoming flows through the outgoing
paths (according to some routing algorithm), distribute a function
of the inputs through each outgoing path. It was shown in [28]
that linear combinations of the inputs suffice to maximize multicast
transmissions. More generally, linear network codes allow to improve
on several other aspects of common networks, in particular their
security [29].
The application of network coding in optical networks has been
widely studied in recent works. For instance, in [30]–[32] the authors
improve the performance, robustness and reliability of unicast and
multicast optical networks, while [33]–[35] focus on the new gener-
ation of passive optical networks commonly deployed in commercial
infrastructures.
A. Notation and Definitions
Let us consider a network over a directed acyclic multigraph G
defined by the tuple (V,E), where V is the set of vertices or nodes
in the graph and E the set of directed edges or links. We denote
the adjacency in the network graph of the node v to the edge e
using the notation e ∈ A(v). Two nodes in the graph, v1, v2 ∈ V ,
can communicate if there exist an edge e such that e ∈ A(v1) and
e ∈ A(v2). For convenience, we simplify the network model allowing
every link to transmit a symbol taking values in the discrete finite
alphabet F . Note that by allowing multiple edges between two nodes
we can generalize the model to links with different capacities.
The network serves a subset of nodes in the graph called source
nodes S . Every source s ∈ S generates a random message Ms taking
uniformly values from the discrete alphabet Ms. We call M the
message jointly generated by all sources and consequently taking
values in M the direct product of all Ms.
In contrast to forward routing (see Fig. 1), routers in the network
coding paradigm are allowed to output a function of the incoming
flows. If we restrict the functions to linear combinations of the inputs,
we can easily deduce that they also represent linear combinations of
the source messages. We associate every edge e in the graph with φe
a mapping from M to F .
3Fig. 1. Comparison of the forwarding paradigm with the network codes
paradigm. The router on the left side of the figure only forwards the incoming
packets, while the router on the right processes the inputs and transmits a
linear combination of the inputs through every outgoing link.
Fig. 2. A QKD link can be considered as composed by a private channel
used for exchanging random secret keys rq and a public channel in which
the key can help the source send a secret message rq +m to the user. It is
equivalent to considering both as a single private link connecting the source
and the user.
Finally, let U be the set of user nodes, a subset of nodes in the
graph. A user u ∈ U aims to receive with no error Mu the messages
sent by Su, a specific subset of S . We will denote, abusing notation,
by Ye and Yu the random symbol sent through the edge e and the
messages reaching the user u, respectively.
B. Security
Before we proceed to formalize the security framework, let us
describe a network consisting of a single QKD link between two users
(see Fig. 2). Logically, we can consider it to be composed by: (i) a
private or secure link, in which a random key rq is exchanged, and
(ii) a public channel in which a message m is sent encrypted with a
one time pad between m and rq . This is equivalent to having a private
channel that a source s can use to send m to a user u. Therefore,
we will consider every link in a QKD network to be a private link
between its neighboring nodes. This restricts eavesdropping to the
intermediate network nodes; only a curious router can gain access
to network messages. This ability to extend the traditional security
perimeter to also cover the communication channel between two
QKD nodes is the consequence of the laws of quantum physics and is
the key attribute of QKD. However, this property cannot be extended
to classical repeaters. In essence, any classical repeater node in a
chain of quantum links gets meaningful information [29]. In order
to prevent the curious routers from accessing information, we can
create extended source messages by adding randomness to the source
messages. Formally, the messages are drawn from the direct product
of the source alphabet M, and a random key alphabet K. The negative
effect of the extended source messages is, however, a reduction in
the achievable transmission rate, since the part devoted to the key
transport increases the security but detracts from the information
bandwidth.
Let us consider a set of |W| independent eavesdroppers. Every
w ∈ W may receive the messages traversing a fixed collection of
nodes, or eavesdropping pattern Bw, in order to recover a subset of
the source message Mw. In consequence an eavesdropper has access
to YBw = {Ye : e ∈ A(v), v ∈ Bw}, the messages traversing Bw.
Note that the elements in W , i.e. eavesdroppers, are elements of the
Fig. 3. In this network, the source s wishes to send a message m to the
user u (possibly a secret key) in the presence of t1 and t2, two intermediate
nodes that eavesdrop their incoming and outgoing links. If t1 and t2 limit
their eavesdropping activities to non cooperative eavesdropping they have no
information about the source message m ∈ M, where k is a random message
from the random alphabet K.
power set of V and in consequence potentially overlapping. We say
that the intermediate nodes in the network graph are weakly trusted
repeaters (WTR) to reflect the assumption that no further cooperation
with the eavesdroppers is performed.
Following [29], a network code is admissible over this eavesdrop
network model if every user node u can recover Mu and the
information that every eavesdropper w holds about Mw does not
reduce its entropy:
H(Mw|Yu) = 0 (1)
and ∀w ∈ W:
H(Mw|YBw ) = H(Mw) (2)
where H(·) and H(·|·) are Shannon’s entropy and Shannon’s con-
ditional entropy, respectively [36]. These two conditions are called
the secure and decodable conditions. Note that this is a generic
definition, the special case in which there is one source, one user
and the eavesdropper is interested in the whole message is just one
of many possible configurations.
C. Practical Scenarios
A simple scenario that offers immediate gain for QKD using the
network coding approach is shown in Fig. 3. In this scenario two
parties, the source s and the user u, exchange a secure key relying
in two intermediate nodes, t1 and t2 as depicted in Fig. 3. The
source generates a secret message M and a secret key K both taking
values over the finite field GF(3). If either t1 or t2 tries to get any
information about M it is easy to verify that
H(M |Yt1) = H(M |Yt2) = 0 (3)
where Yt1 and Yt2 are the sets of extended messages traversing t1
and t2, respectively.
The previous scenario can be used to enable multicast key distri-
bution, as shown in Fig. 4, without providing any further information
to the intermediate routers: the extra links joining t1 and t2 with the
second user u2 replicate the links with u1.
Consider now the scenario depicted in Fig. 5. In this scenario,
proposed by Chan et al. in [37], four nodes (s1, s2, u1 and u2)
exchange keys pairwise (m1 between s1 and u2, and m2 between
s2 and u1) relying in one randomizing node t1 and one centralized
node t2. In other words, u1 and u2 should be able to recover m2 and
m1, respectively, but not m1 and m2. In effect, the users recover the
desired message by adding the incoming flows and
4Fig. 4. In this figure the source s distributes the same secret key to two
different users u1 and u2.
Fig. 5. This figure shows a network with two sources s1 and s2, and two
users u1 and u2. The sources, s1 and s2, transmit m1 and m2 to the users,
u2 and u1, respectively, while no information is leaked to the intermediate
nodes or the remaining users.
H(M1|Yu1) = H(M2|Yu2) = 0 (4)
It should be noted that H(M |Yt1) = 0, H(M1|Yt2) =
H(M2|Yt2) = 0 but H(M |Yt2) > 0. That is, the network code
is admissible if t2 aims to recover either M1 or M2 but not both.
D. Byzantine Adversaries
In the analysis presented in the previous sections the adversaries
have been described as passive eavesdroppers: they are assumed to
be able to read the information stream, but not to modify it. This kind
of bound on the eavesdropping power might be a concern because
QKD, in absence of classical repeaters, provides their users with
stronger security. However, this limitation on the eavesdropper is not
actually a problem. In general, when dealing with the distribution of
messages over a network, the security is studied against t-bounded
adversaries, i.e. adversaries in control of at most t nodes. These so
called Byzantine adversaries are allowed to listen in their incoming
links and output any message on their outgoing links.
A network with t-bounded adversaries is said to be secure if it pro-
vides the sources and users with perfect secrecy and perfect resiliency.
Perfect secrecy is achieved if the adversaries get no meaningful
information, in an information theoretic way, about the exchanged
messages. Perfect resiliency means that t-bounded adversaries are
unable to stop the sources from reliably transmitting the messages to
the users. Dolev et al. [38] showed that if a network with one-way
links has at least 3t + 1 node disjoint paths between a source and
a user, the source can transmit messages with perfect secrecy and
perfect resiliency (in the presence of t-bounded adversaries). In the
network coding community Jaggi et al. [39] showed, surprisingly,
that if there are 3t + 1 node disjoint paths a source can transmit
secure messages with rate C − t, where C is the network capacity.
That is, the only rate reduction from full capacity is t and no extra
penalty is paid.
Resiliency is a desirable property for QKD networks since a QKD
link is in itself non resilient, i.e. QKD links are not protected from
denial of service attacks. However, with current QKD networks
dealing with small sets of nodes, the need for 3t + 1 node disjoint
paths is a strong constraint: for instance, if the network is to be
secured against any 3-bounded adversary, it has to provide 10 disjoint
paths. Salvail et al. propose in [40] a weaker form of security: the
network is secure if it provides with perfect secrecy and message
authenticity. Message authenticity is achieved if either the message
reaches the user uncorrupted or the user and the source are aware
that it is corrupted. A message authentication schema is proposed
such that in a network with l disjoint paths, it can still provide
message authenticity if there is at least one uncorrupted path, the
network can provide message authenticity. Their schema is said to
be unforgeable because no intermediate node, or set of nodes, outside
from the nodes belonging to the uncorrupt path have any information
about the exchanged messages. This same kind of restriction can be
imposed to the network code scenarios; eavesdropping patterns can
be defined such that the eavesdroppers can tap any node except for
nodes belonging to one uncorrupted path. With these eavesdropping
patterns the authentication mechanism can be applied with the same
security.
III. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
QKD devices use qubits as their information carriers. These qubits
are described mathematically as vectors in a two dimensional Hilbert
space, while in practice, any two dimensional quantum system can
be used to encode a qubit. When qubits are used in a quantum
communication system, such as a QKD device, photons are the
usual choice for the physical realization. Properties like polarization,
phase or even time can be used to encode a qubit into a single
photon, making them a flexible choice that are also reasonably easy
to transmit, detect and manipulate: laser diodes, avalanche photo
diodes, beam splitters, modulators, etc., are all the optical components
needed. Photon qubits are transmitted through either free space (air)
or optical fiber, being the latter the logical choice for communication
networks. As any signal propagating through an absorbing medium,
photons suffer an exponential attenuation when traveling through
the fiber. This losses are harmful for the extremely sensitive QKD
devices, which are made to transmit and manipulate single photons.
Moreover, the interaction of the photon qubit with the environment
is actually indistinguishable from an eavesdropper manipulation,
thus rendering the signal unusable for cryptographic purposes. This
includes any attempt to amplify the signal, which is basically an
interaction with the qubit in order to know its state and copy it in
many photons, something that cannot be done without introducing
an error, the same error that is used to rule out the existence of an
eavesdropper and that forms the basis of a QKD protocol. Under these
conditions, a QKD device is limited to use fully transparent optical
networks without active devices such as amplifiers or electro-optical
converters and, even in this case, its maximum reach is limited.
A. QKD Performance
There are many factors that hinder the performance of a QKD
system: far from ideal single-photon detectors or emitters are the
two main ones; but even if they could be made perfect and working
at a very high speed rate, practical limits of QKD systems would be
ultimately set by the absorptions in the quantum channel. A system
working at 10 GHz and with detectors 100% efficient4 would have
a maximum practical reach of 500 km using the best fiber available
and working in 1550 nm, the most transparent window.
4Compared to the 5 MHz and 10% quantum detector efficiency of the
systems commercially available today
5As an example of the practical QKD limits, we calculated the secret
key rate using two different fiber based QKD systems, GYS [41] and
Clavis [42], and present them in Fig. 6. GYS was selected because is a
laboratory implementation with typical components and parameters
that has been widely used in the literature as a benchmark, while
Clavis is a QKD system already available in the market. The latter
is the development variant of the id Quantique Vectis system, used
to provide commercial grade security based on QKD. The specific
parameters for the systems are provided in the caption of Fig. 6.
Although it is typical to present the secret-key rate as a function of
the distance in km, we show it as a function of the losses, which is the
meaningful figure when using QKD in networks instead of a direct
point to point link. This allows us to show (grayed out areas) the
absorptions of common network components. This highlights the fact
that in real optical networks they are the limiting factor. Fig. 6 depicts
the key exchange of two nodes that are located in different access
networks of a metropolitan area network (its structure is detailed in
Section IV). The absorptions are presented in the same order in which
a real qubit would find them.
Following the standard procedures for computing the secret key
rate, the quantum bit error rate is roughly approximated as a function
of the losses and the dark count rate which is assumed to be constant
(1.7 × 10−6 in the GYS experiment and 2 × 10−5 for the Clavis
system). Since losses reduce the noise to signal ratio, the secret key
rate in Fig. 6 can also be regarded as a function of the quantum bit
error rate.
The secret key rate shows the amount of secret key extracted
per transmitted qubit. To calculate the secret key rate per second,
it has to be multiplied by the emitter frequency (5 − 10 MHz for
current commercial QKD systems). As expected, the secret key rate
decreases exponentially with the losses up to a point where it goes
to zero rather abruptly. This effect has nothing to do with the optical
network, but with the way in which the secret key has to be extracted.
When losses are higher, the signal to noise ratio is worse and the
quantum bit error rate grows. Since in cryptography one has to deal
with the worst possible case, all errors have to be attributed to an
attacker. More quantum bit error rate means, then, that in the last
step in a QKD communication, known as privacy amplification, a
high number of bits have to be discarded to account for the presence
of an hypothetical eavesdropper.
In any case, Fig. 6 clearly shows that there is a maximum number
of losses that can be tolerated. This is approximately 20 dB for the
commercial system. This loss budget, that in a point to point link
could amount to 80 km of standard optical fiber, is not enough to cross
(without repeaters) a typical metropolitan area network. It should be
noted that continuous variable QKD is an alternative technology for
using in future telecom networks since it is intrinsically more adapted
to WDM [18], and although it has classically been considered highly
limited in distance, recent experiments show that this technology is
also capable of achieving the aforementioned 80 km [43]. New types
of QKD devices could also be well suited for network integration
[44]. It is to be noted that tolerance to losses and high bit rates are
complementary magnitudes, since high speed systems would be, in
general, able to reach further away with a useful key rate.
B. Trusted Repeaters
Modern optical networks have embraced the full optical domain
model, hence they are capable of transporting quantum signals.
There have been many studies trying to integrate QKD in optical
networks [14]–[17], [19]. However, the distance limitation still per-
sists. As mentioned in the introduction, there are only two ways to
overcome this. The best one is to build a repeater or amplifier in the
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Fig. 6. Secret-key rate, in bits per qubit sent, of two different QKD systems,
GYS and Clavis, using the BB84 protocol with decoy states as a function of
the absorptions in the network. The ratio of secret key is calculated using the
asymptotic approximation proposed in [45]. The parameters considered for
the GYS system can be found in [41]. In the Clavis system [42], we use an
absorption value of 0.25 dB/km for the fiber (both devices are transmitting
at the 1550 nm window). Losses due to network devices are depicted using
a shadowed region. Note that the different regions are plotted in the order in
which an hypothetical photon qubit would find them if it is connected through
an access network homed into a passive metropolitan ring and crosses two
core nodes before being dropped to its final destination.
quantum regime. This is a possibility not ruled out by theory and
with good experimental progress [24] but one that, by all accounts,
is still many years in the future. The other one is to build a classical
repeater that is actually a measurement device that relays the keys
produced in the first quantum link.
To extend the reach of QKD, an intermediate classical repeater
can be used (see Fig. 7a). It is to be noted that a QKD link is
composed of an emitter side and a receiver side. The emitter is
typically made up of a laser diode while the receiver contains the
single-photon detectors, which are based on avalanche photo diodes.
Thus, a classical repeater, t, is composed of a receiver and an emitter
(other pairing possibilities exist, but here we stick with the most
simple one). The receiver links with the previous emitter in the
chain and the emitter with the forthcoming receiver (in the figure,
s and u, respectively). The receiver is used to establish a quantum
channel different from the quantum channel built up with the emitter.
Both quantum channels create, independently, keys rq1 and rq2 with
the same length. Then, through the public authenticated channel,
a message m is relayed securely computing a one-time pad with
the QKD keys created before (the logical scheme of this process is
depicted in Fig. 7b). This process can continue with any number
of intermediate links, but each repeater t will know the message
being transmitted. The secure message m can be used later as a key
to cipher future communications. Unfortunately, it only takes one
corrupted node to completely spoil the security of the system. This
full trust condition is not acceptable in many cases.
C. Weakly Trusted Repeaters
A message is information theoretically secure if the entropy of
the message is not reduced with respect to a well-defined adversary
and scenario. In QKD the eavesdropper is allowed to perform any
attack allowed by quantum physics. However, the laboratories of
the legitimate parties are assumed to be trusted and their devices
well known. Recent studies show that it is possible to extract a non
zero, though significantly smaller, secret key without making any
6(a) Detail of the messages exchanged with a trusted
repeater.
(b) Logical schema of a link extended with a trusted
repeater.
Fig. 7. The reach can be extended by allowing trusted intermediate nodes
to forward the key. The grey area marks the distance limitation of the QKD
system with emitter source at s.
assumption on the device characterization. This model is known as
device independent QKD [46]. The secret key distilled by a device
independent QKD protocol improves the security of a key distilled by
a QKD protocol only in the sense that it reduces the set of hypothesis
for information theoretic security.
If we use trusted repeaters to extend the reach of QKD the key is
still information theoretically secure provided that the eavesdropper
is limited to quantum attacks and the (well-characterized) laboratories
and devices of Bob and Alice as well as all the intermediate repeaters
are outside of Eve’s control. However, the full disclosure implied by
trusted repeaters might be too strong in many scenarios. In these
situations, trusted repeaters are not a valid option. In contrast, we
can only weakly trust the intermediate nodes and consider that some
might try to recover information of the secret key or message,
i.e. the setting discussed in Section II. At design time the set of
tappable nodes and possible associations is established. The set can
be delimited in a rather precise fashion, e.g. any set of ℓ nodes can
be tapped, etc. Then, the users can search for a secure network code
that fulfills their trust requirements. Nonetheless, the weakly trusted
repeater paradigm does not increase the security with respect to
trusted repeaters in a quantifiable way, what it offers is the possibility
to modulate the number of intermediate repeaters that a user is willing
to trust. It is in the same sense that device independent QKD improves
on QKD that the weakly trusted repeaters paradigm improves on the
security of the trusted repeaters scenario.
Explicit code constructions in the general wiretapping model is an
open problem [37]. However, in the single source scenario, secure
network code constructions are fairly well known [29] and, in simple
cases like the examples from Section II, they can be discovered by
inspection. Hence, we can readily use this formalism to reduce the
dependence on the intermediate nodes.
Fig. 8. The scenario corresponds to an optical network with two disjoint
paths that are used to overcome the QKD distance limitation. As in Fig. 7,
the grey sector marks the distance limitation of the QKD system with emitter
source at s.
IV. WEAKLY TRUSTED REPEATERS ON PASSIVE OPTICAL
NETWORKS
Assuming a network where nodes can be deployed at will, we can
implement directly the first example from Section II (see Fig. 8).
The distance limitation of a QKD emitter at the source s is denoted
by a gray sector. This limitation can be overcome by introducing
two disjoint paths between the source, s, and the user, u. In contrast
to the trusted repeaters solution, different messages are sent through
each path, such that here the key is not fully disclosed to any of the
intermediate nodes.
Unfortunately, despite its benefits, practical optical networks do
not have this deployment ease. Instead, nodes have to be arranged
in specific structures to fit different geographical, cost, deployment,
etc. constraints. The next scenario focuses on one of these kind of
optical networks: metropolitan area networks.
As already mentioned in the introduction, optical networks are the
preferred technology for commercial telecommunication networks.
For instance, in metropolitan areas, optical fiber and passive tech-
nology is widely available, making possible to establish an optical
path among two nodes. Here we focus on metropolitan area networks
using only passive technology, since due to the moderate absorptions,
optical paths do not need amplification. This means that they are not
disrupted at the quantum level, hence being suitable for QKD.
Metropolitan area networks span from ten to several hundred
kilometers. Fig. 9 shows the typical5 design of such networks: a cen-
tral ring-shaped backbone connected to peripheral access networks.
The backbone is composed of multiple nodes, separated by tens of
kilometers, that connect to the optical line termination (OLT) of the
access networks. These nodes use different kinds of optical add-drop
multiplexers (OADM), for instance reconfigurable OADM, to route
signals to the correct access network depending on their wavelength.
Starting at the OLT, the access networks follow a point to multipoint
topology in order to serve nodes, known as optical network units
(ONU), located in the same zone. The preferred choice for access
networks is passive technology, thus the signal is distributed among
ONU via passive devices like splitters o arrayed waveguide gratings
(AWG). The typical distance between the backbone node and the
ONU is a few kilometers [47]. Using this structure, metropolitan area
5Actual networks can be much more complicated, reflecting the competition
over time among technologies and specific growth needs. We consider here
only the typical model as representative enough.
7Fig. 9. Example of a typical metropolitan optical network. The core ring is
depicted on top, while the lower part represents the point to multipoint access
network.
networks can accommodate many users via multiplexing techniques
such as wavelength division or time division multiplexing (WDM and
TDM respectively).
The use of QKD in optical network is further complicated if
quantum and classical signals are multiplexed. Since at the quantum
level we are dealing with single photon signals, any leak of the
classical signals, typically 100 dB stronger, will spoil the quantum
channel. Although there are studies demonstrating this coexistence
(e.g. [15], [48], [49]), its effect basically amounts to increase the
noise and, thus, reduce the maximum distance/rate achievable. Being
the only purpose of this section to show the benefits of weakly
trusted repeaters in optical networks, we prefer to keep the network
in the quantum regime and avoid these problems. Thus we assume
the network is being used only for QKD purposes. An authenticated
classical channel is supposed to be available among any nodes.
To secure a metropolitan optical network, a quantum channel has
to be created among any two nodes of the access networks. Therefore,
first we connect an emitter to the end of an access network. Looking
at Fig. 6 and Table I, we realize that losses, due to fiber and network
components, do not allow to directly plug the receiver in a different
access network. Intermediate nodes are needed. Possible locations
are the immediate backbone node or its closest neighbors. In the
associated graph, this scheme generates a bipartite graph with emitters
placed at the end of the access network and receivers at the backbone
nodes. Each emitter has several outgoing links: to the receiver in its
own backbone node and the neighboring ones. The type of QKD
device selected for each node is not arbitrary. Receivers are more
expensive and difficult to maintain due to the single-photon detectors,
hence they are kept at the telco installations.
This shows that telecom networks not only suit QKD, but they are
flexible enough to provide several alternative paths among two nodes
(at least in metro areas). Therefore, the network coding approach
described in Section II can be used. This implies that a commercial
optical network with improved security and resilience, as compared
to the traditional scheme, can be designed using QKD and WTR.
6These values belong to low-losses components (except for fiber, that we
use the value for the installed in typical links) available in the market.
TABLE I
INSERTION LOSSES
Device Operation wavelength Insertion loss6
Single-mode fiber 1550 nm 0.25 dB/km
1 : 2 Splitter 1260 – 1610 nm 3.5 dB
1 : 4 Splitter 1260 – 1610 nm 7 dB
CWDM add-drop multiplexer 1270 – 1610 nm 0.6 dB
DWDM add-drop multiplexer 1525 – 1610 nm 0.6 dB
Bandpass filter 0.7 dB
Circulator 1530 – 1565 nm 0.5 dB
Connectors 0.2 dB/pair
AWG (40 channels) 1525 – 1610 nm 3 dB
V. NETWORK PROTOTYPES
A simple scenario where two parties communicate through two
intermediate nodes can be derived from the theoretical framework
described in Section II. In this scenario the parties are able to
exchange a secret-key under weak trust assumptions. This simplicity
also facilitates the implementation of secure optical networks, like
the ones described in the previous section. Here we propose several
network prototypes to demonstrate that secure telecom PON can be
implemented using QKD and WTR in metropolitan area networks
(see Fig. 9).
A first prototype is depicted in Fig. 10. Emitters, labeled as Txn,
are connected to user nodes in an access network, and receivers,
labeled as Rxn, are connected to backbone nodes. In a backbone
node, several passive WDM components are included to route the
quantum signals. The objective is to reach from an emitter at least
two different receivers in order to have several paths for improved
security. A coarse WDM OADM (CWDM) is used to route signals
within a passband to the corresponding access network. Add and drop
ports, A and D in the figure, are connected to a dense WDM OADM
(DWDM). The function of this second multiplexer is to filter signals
with the wavelengths associated to a receiver7. In this wavelength
addressing scheme, quantum signals can reach a receiver from two
different directions. Both DWDM OADM are connected to a band-
pass filter, Fa, using the reflected and filtered ports. The common
port of the Fa filter connects the backbone with the access network,
thus routing signals from the access network to the correct destination
within the backbone ring. In the access network several emitters are
connected to the splitter. Fiber lengths are assumed to be within the
typical distances for metropolitan area networks.
Even though this prototype works under the WDM paradigm, a
wavelength multiplexer cannot be used because of the backbone
CWDM OADM. Instead, an splitter is used, as in GPON. In this
way, multiple emitters can communicate simultaneously with differ-
ent receivers, because each receiver is addressed using a different
wavelength. In particular, in this prototype each emitter can commu-
nicate with three receivers, all of them within the range of current
commercial QKD systems (Fig. 6): the receiver in the immediate
backbone node and both neighboring backbone nodes. For instance,
in Fig. 10, Tx2 is able to communicate with Rx1, Rx2 and Rx3.
Since communications between farther nodes are unfeasible because
of the absorptions, wavelengths for the filters Fa and DWDM OADM
can be used repeatedly all over the network. This reduces the number
of required wavelengths and simplifies the network construction.
An example to illustrate the operation mode of this prototype is
as follows. Assume that Tx1 and Tx2 cannot communicate directly
7This is one of many possible configurations, for instance, DWDM OADM
could be replaced by a series of band-pass filters.
8Fig. 10. Scheme of a QKD-PON under the network coding paradigm. Coarse WDM (CWDM) add-drop modules are used to provide a channel in the third
transmission window, around 1550 nm, corresponding to the lowest absorption band. Dense WDM (DWDM) add-drop modules are used to route signals to
the corresponding receiver. Finally, a band-pass filter Fa is used to connect the access network with the backbone and route signals into the correct direction
within the backbone.
because of the absorptions and then they want to exchange a key using
weakly trusted repeaters, thus they need at least two intermediate
nodes:
1) Tx1 transmits at 1540 nm. The signal is filtered by Fa and it is
dropped at the DWDM OADM, reaching then Rx1. The total
loss budget, according to Table I, is ≈ 10.6 dB.
2) Tx1 transmits at 1545 nm. The signal is filtered by Fa, passes
the DWDM OADM, exits the backbone node, is dropped by the
CWDM OADM and is dropped again by the DWDM OADM
in front of Rx2. The total loss budget is ≈ 15.5 dB.
3) Tx2 transmits at 1545 nm. The signal is reflected by Fa and
dropped by the DWDM OADM in order to reach Rx2. The
total loss budget is ≈ 10.6 dB.
4) Tx2 transmits at 1540 nm. The signal is reflected by Fa, it
passes through the DWDM OADM, exits the backbone node,
is dropped by the CWDM OADM and DWDM OADM, and
then reaches Rx1. The total loss budget is ≈ 15.5 dB.
The logical diagram of the communication is presented in Fig. 11a.
Note how it reflects the network coding structure of Fig. 3. Using
the secure keys exchanged through QKD, a secret message m can
be exchanged between Tx1 and Tx2 through authenticated classical
channels. No information is disclosed to the intermediate (repeater)
nodes: Rx1 and Rx2. They act as WTR and they gain no information
about the message m although they know either m+k or m−k. This
simple case can be modified to exchanges between farther nodes. For
instance, Fig. 11b shows the case where Tx1 exchanges a key with
Tx3. Nodes connected to the same splitter can be handled in a similar
way.
Fig. 12 shows a second network prototype. This has the advantage
of requiring less components than the prototype depicted in Fig. 10.
The band-pass filter Fa used to route signals within the backbone
is replaced by a circulator, such that signals can now be transmitted
in only one direction. In such a configuration, an emitter can reach
only the receiver attached to its immediate backbone node and the
first backbone node to the right. This limitation can be avoided in
two ways: (i) assuming that the backbone network is a closed ring,
such that any emitter can exchange keys with at least one forward
receiver. Thus, two disjoint paths can be drawn using the full ring. (ii)
Using an additional identical backbone network to transmit signals in
(a) Tx1 to Tx2
(b) Tx1 to Tx3
Fig. 11. Diagrams for network coding purposes corresponding to key
exchanges between nodes Tx1 and Tx2 (top) and between Tx1 and Tx3
using the optical network depicted in Fig. 10.
the opposite direction. Note that in this prototype only one DWDM
OADM is required, but this advantage disappears if we set up a
second network to communicate in the opposite direction.
A third network prototype is shown in Fig. 13. This improves in
terms of the number of users, resources and loss budget. Note that
reducing the losses we are also increasing the final secret-key rate in
a QKD system, thus, increasing the overall WTR transmission rate
too. The circulator is replaced by an splitter, solving the problem
of backward communications. CWDM OADM are removed since
emitters and distant receivers cannot exchange secure keys because of
the absorptions. This could be a disadvantage for the next generation
of QKD systems which are able to withstand at least 30 dB. In
9Fig. 12. Alternative scheme of a QKD-PON with circulators instead of
band-pass filters. This reduces the number of components, but signals can
travel only in the forward direction. This means that, in order to recover the
connectivity with the previous node, accessible in the scheme of Fig. 10,
either the quantum signal has to travel the full ring in the forward direction
till reaching the node before or a second ring running in parallel but in the
backward direction must be used.
Fig. 13. Third prototype of a QKD-PON with splitters instead of circulators to
solve the problem of only forward communications. Moreover, the number of
OADM is reduced. These changes permit to use an AWG instead of an splitter,
and thus increase the number of users at the access network. The disadvantage
is that this scheme does not allow key exchanges beyond the nearest backbone
node (e.g. Tx1 is not able to directly connect beyond Rx2). This is not an
option with current commercial QKD systems, since their loss budget is as
much 20 dB, but with the expected new generation, able to withstand 30
dB, this advantage —except for the increase in throughput between nearest
neighbor nodes— would be lost. In this case, other schemes like the first two
prototypes can be used.
this case, other schemes like the first two prototypes can be used to
exchange keys between distant nodes. As a result, backbone nodes
require only three components: splitters, OADM and receivers. Now,
the splitter in the access network can also be replaced by an AWG
used as wavelength optical multiplexer. Since the AWG is able to
multiplex N wavelengths (channels) into a single fiber, it increases
the number of users up to 40 with less insertion losses.
In a basic setup each user is connected to an output port of
the AWG. Each one communicates using a particular wavelength.
However, because of the periodicity of the AWG, lower and upper
spectrum bands are also multiplexed. Thus, each user is actually
able to communicate using more than one wavelength: the wave-
length within the spectrum band and the corresponding periodic
wavelengths. This allows to address multiple receivers from a single
emitter. In this case, care must be taken in that the passband of the
OADM coincides with a band of the AWG. The use of several bands
in an AWG is a common solution in commercial optical networks
for instance to separate downstream from upstream signals [50].
Although all the examples comply with the 20 dB loss budget
of current commercial QKD systems, a better tolerance to losses
and higher bit rates are expected for the next generation of QKD
systems [51]–[54]. This will allow to put QKD devices in farther
away locations and increase the number of disjoint paths, limited to
two in the prototypes, thus improving the throughput and security of
the network. Moreover, we limit ourselves to the PON realm in order
to not have to contend with any active switching elements. If these
are included in the network design, they open new possibilities at the
expense of having to deal with routing algorithms that might include
other security threats.
A rough estimate of the cost, as a function of the number of compo-
nents, can be used to briefly compare the three proposed prototypes.
On one hand, the third prototype is the one with fewer main network
components per branch: an optical divisor (AWG), a DWDM OADM
connecting the receivers, and a splitter to connect the access and
backbone network. On the other, the second prototype requires and
additional component since the access network is connected to the
backbone using a circulator and a CWDM OADM instead of the
splitter. Thus, the third prototype is slightly better than the second
relative to the number of components. Finally, the first prototype is
clearly a more expensive scenario with five main network components
per branch.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduce weakly trusted repeaters for quantum
key distribution networks. The objective is to overcome the distance
limitation of QKD with current technology, while improving on the
traditional trusted repeater model used in these cases. We formalize
these WTR using a network coding approach and construct infor-
mation theoretically secure scenarios, assumed given specific trust
structures. In particular, that there is at least one non-malicious
path among the several disjoint paths used. Securing networks with
WTR reduces the strong full trust dependence that is assumed for
traditional trusted repeaters which, in turn, improves the security of
applications and services relying on them. WTR can directly found its
niche in organizations with private networks and high security needs,
e.g., telecom companies, banks, military institutions or government
agencies. In these cases, although nodes belong to the organization,
they cannot be fully trusted (possible eavesdropping in the future).
WTR can also be useful in networks infrastructure where each path
belongs to a different owner. In contrast to the private network
situation, here all paths are initially weakly trusted.
Moreover, we have also shown practical scenarios based on optical
networks, and detailed implementations with standard components of
typical telecom networks. In these networks, WTR can be used along
with QKD to exchange secure keys between two users. In contrast
with existing proposals, the structure of WTR is more simple and
homogeneous, hence facilitating its industrialization. These scenarios
can be easily extended to exchange secret keys among a higher
number of users and through more intermediate nodes. Considering a
higher number of disjoint paths would certainly bring more flexibility
to the trust structures. This approach would, as well, open the door to
other important topics such as the robustness and resiliency of these
networks.
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